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Payback Without Apology
Abstract
When interest rates are uncertain, the net-present-value threshold required to justify an
irreversible investment is increasing in the length of a project’s payback period. Thus, slow-
payback projects should face a higher hurdle than fast-payback projects, just as investment
folklore suggests. This result suggests that the widely disparaged use of payback for cap-
ital budgeting purposes can be an intuitive response to correctly perceived costs and benefits.
Payback Without Apology
1 Introduction
One of the simplest project-evaluation methods is the payback period — the expected length
of time for an investment to return its initial cost. According to this method, the investment is
viable if and only if payback is sufficiently fast. However, simplicity has its costs: the payback
method ignores both the time value of money and any cashflows that occur subsequent to pay-
back. By contrast, net-present-value (NPV) provides a decision rule that is consistent with the
maximisation of shareholder value, so this method has received greater theoretical acceptance.
Given this consensus, one of the more perplexing, and most criticized, aspects of corporate
investment practice is the apparent preference for short-term projects with a fast payback.
Without exception, surveys of capital budgeting practice highlight the continuing popularity of
payback. For the US, Gilbert and Reichert (1995), Gitman and Forrester (1977), Oblak and
Helm (1980), Stanley and Block (1984) and Visscher and Stansfield (1997) find that between 40%
and 90% of U.S. firms use payback as a capital budgeting technique while Jog and Srivastava
(1995), Kester et al (1999), Patterson (1989), and Shao and Shao (1993) report similar findings
for firms in Asia, Canada, Europe, and Oceania. Longitudinal studies over 17-year periods for
the U.S. (Gitman and Vendenberg, 2000) and the U.K. (Pike, 1996) also find little evidence of
declining usage of the payback technique over time. Such myopic behaviour has traditionally
been condemned by academic writers because, in calculating NPV, cashflows that occur in the
more distant future are automatically discounted most heavily via the compounding mechanism.
To then further penalize projects with a high proportion of such cashflows seems inconsistent
with an efficient allocation of investment funds.
In this paper, we offer a value-maximising justification for the use of payback.1 In the
next section, we develop a very simple model of optimal capital budgeting in a world with
uncertain interest rates and dynamic and irreversible investment opportunities, and show that
slow-payback projects must pass a more stringent test than otherwise-equivalent fast-payback
projects. Section 3 discusses some implications and limitations of this result, while Section 4
provides some brief concluding remarks.
2 Payback and the optimal investment rule in a dynamic world
To make our analysis as transparent and intuitive as possible, we use a minimalist model of
investment under uncertainty. In brief, we analyse the investment timing choice of a firm facing
uncertain future interest rates and show that the NPV threshold required to justify investment
1Other authors to advance explanations for payback include Chaney (1989), Cornell (1999), Narayanan
(1985a,b), Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Stein (1988), Thakor (1990, 1993), and Weingartner (1969). With the
exception of Cornell, all these depend on deviations from first-best value maximisation.
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is an increasing function of the length of payback period.
Consider an investment project that incurs a sunk cost I and generates constant expected
real cashflows X for T years after launching. In general, the present value of these expected
cashflows is obtained by discounting each of them at a term-specific rate that includes a premium
for systematic risk. However, to avoid equilibrium asset pricing complexities that are of second-
order importance for capital budgeting decisions , we assume (i) that the risk of these cashflows is
entirely idiosyncratic and (ii) that the yield curve is flat. As a result, all cashflows are discounted
at the riskless interest rate common to all maturities.
With these assumptions, investment today (at time 0) yields the project NPV
N0 =
∫
T
0
X exp(−rt)dt− I = X
(
1− exp(−rT )
r
)
− I, (1)
where r is the current riskless interest rate. If the project is ‘now-or-never’ or is fully reversible
(so that the future is in effect certain), then the standard textbook case applies: investment is
justified if and only if N0 ≥ 0 and payback per se is irrelevant. However, as discussed in detail
by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), most projects are at least partially irreversible and have some
degree of timing flexibility. To capture the essence of this idea, we assume the firm has a simple
dynamic choice: either invest now (at time 0) or delay investment until some future time s.2
Investment today necessitates the firm giving up the opportunity to invest at time s, so the cost
of this sacrifice must be incorporated in the investment decision. Letting N∗ denote the time 0
value of this opportunity cost, investment today is justified if and only if N0 ≥ N
∗.
If time s interest rates are uncertain, then delay of investment has value because of the
potential for a lower discount rate.3 We assume a simple binomial structure: the time s interest
rate either equals rd < r with probability p or it equals ru > r with probability 1 − p. As a
result, the possible payoffs to time s investment are
Ns(rd) = X
(
1− exp(−rdT )
rd
)
− I,
Ns(ru) = X
(
1− exp(−ruT )
ru
)
− I.
To capture the principal implications of interest rate uncertainty in a simple way, we assume
Ns(rd) > 0 > Ns(ru), i.e., investment is profitable at date s if the interest rate is low, but not
otherwise.4 Thus, if the firm delays until time s, investment commences at that date if the
interest rate turns out to be low, but the project is abandoned if the interest rate is high.
2This simple timing decision is similar to that analyzed by Abel et al. (1996). Extending the model to
incorporate multiple delay dates and an optimal stopping rule, as in McDonald and Siegel (1986) or Boyle and
Guthrie (2003b), would complicate the analysis without affecting the results. We discuss this point in more detail
in Section 3.
3Most studies of the investment timing problem focus on the case where a positive value of N∗ emanates from
shocks to future expected cashflows. However, as Ingersoll and Ross (1992) point out, interest rate uncertainty
(shocks to expected returns) is an even more ubiquitous phenomenon.
4If both payoffs are positive, then waiting simply generates a payoff of N0 s years later, so time 0 investment
is trivially optimal.
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In this setup, investment today sacrifices a potentially higher payoff Ns(rd) at time s. Thus,
N∗ is simply the expected present value of this foregone payoff:
N∗ = p exp(−rs)Ns(rd). (2)
We wish to determine the effect, if any, of a change in payback on the investment threshold N∗
for a project with given net-present-value N0. If, for example, a longer payback period leads
to greater N∗, then the level of N0 required to justify investment is greater for long-payback
projects.
To model an increase in the length of payback period, we ‘stretch’ the project’s expected
cashflows out over a longer life (i.e., greater T ), where, to isolate any payback effect, the resulting
fall in each annual cashflow leaves N0 unchanged. From (1), this satisfies
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0 =
∂X
∂T
(
1− exp(−rT )
r
)
+X exp(−rT ),
so that
∂X
∂T
=
−rX exp(−rT )
1− exp(−rT )
. (3)
The effect of longer payback on N∗ and the optimal decision rule can then be determined by
differentiating (2) with respect to T . Using the chain rule, this yields6
∂N∗
∂T
= p exp(−rs)
(
∂Ns
∂X
∂X
∂T
+
∂Ns
∂T
)
= p exp(−rs)
(
∂X
∂T
(
1− exp(−rdT )
rd
)
+X exp(−rdT )
)
. (4)
After substituting in (3), this becomes
∂N∗
∂T
= p exp(−rs)
(
−rX exp(−rT )
1− exp(−rT )
(
1− exp(−rdT )
rd
)
+X exp(−rdT )
)
=
p exp(−rs)(1− exp(−rdT ))X
rdT
(
f(rdT )− f(rT )
)
,
where
f(z) =
z exp(−z)
1− exp(−z)
.
From Abramowitz and Stegun (1970, p. 70), we know that exp(−z) > 1− z for all z > 0, so
f ′(z) =
exp(−z)(1− z − exp(−z))
(1− exp(−z))2
< 0.
f is thus a strictly decreasing function of z for all z > 0, so that f(rdT ) > f(rT ) and
∂N∗
∂T
is
strictly positive, i.e., longer payback increases the NPV threshold required to justify investment.
That is, projects that return their investment cost only over a long period of time must offer an
‘NPV-premium’ relative to their shorter-term counterparts.
5The right-side of the first equation below uses the product rule of differential calculus. For a simple discussion
of this rule, see Watsham and Parrimore (1997, pp. 90–91).
6See Watsham and Parrimore (1997, p. 91).
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This result runs counter to the prescriptions appearing in modern accounting and finance
textbooks, but is consistent with investment folklore that short payback is beneficial. In fact, it
is a simple manifestation of a general property: when interest rates are uncertain, the incentive
to wait is greater for long-term than for short-term projects, so the former must pass a stricter
test in order to justify investment. To see why, note that flexibility in investment timing is
valuable because it offers the opportunity to obtain a greater payoff in the future without the
risk of receiving a negative payoff (since in that case investment does not proceed). With risky
interest rates, this opportunity is most valuable for slow-payback projects: unexpectedly low
interest rates have a greater positive impact on the present value of long-dated cashflows, so
there is a stronger incentive to delay long-term projects. Consequently, the opportunity cost of
investing now is greater for long-term projects, thereby motivating a bias towards short-term
projects.
As the above explanation suggests, this result is a straightforward combination of the theories
of bond pricing, option pricing, and capital budgeting. From bond pricing theory, we know that
the value of long-dated cashflows is more sensitive to discount rate shocks, and hence, for a
given interest rate distribution, more volatile.7 From option pricing theory, we know that greater
volatility makes options more valuable and hence more difficult to justify exercising. From capital
budgeting theory, we know that the choice of project investment date is akin to determining
an optimal exercise policy for a call option. Our contribution in this paper is to combine these
insights in order to clarify the potential contribution of payback to value-maximising investment
decisions.
Although the particular mechanism described above is new, we are not the first to point
out a link between payback and the value of waiting to invest. Boyle and Guthrie (1997),
McDonald (2000), and Wambach (2000) all recognise that shorter payback can be associated
with a lower waiting value, but arrive at this conclusion via a very different route to this paper.
In their models, interest rates are fixed, but long-payback projects are assumed to have high
expected cashflow growth which, in turn, gives rise to a high value of waiting. By contrast,
our story emphasizes the importance of uncertain interest rates, in keeping with the traditional
practitioner risk-based justification for payback. Our analysis thus formalizes and clarifies the
traditional explanation. Furthermore, uncertainty about interest rates is common to all real-
world projects, whereas high cashflow growth is by no means a guaranteed indicator of long
payback, so our story seems likely to apply in a much wider variety of situations.8
7The concept of duration is commonly used to measure the interest rate sensitivity of a bond. For an application
of duration to capital budgeting, see Rhys and Tippett (1996).
8Boyle and Guthrie (2003a) establish a link between project value and the immediacy of cashflows in the
presence of uncertain interest rates, but do not address the form of the optimal investment rule or its link to
payback.
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3 Implications and Limitations
The principal implication of our analysis is that a seemingly puzzling aspect of capital budgeting
practice has a value-maximizing justification. In particular, our story provides support for
decision rules that (i) require projects with a positive NPV to also have a sufficiently short
payback period or (ii) use a higher discount rate for long-term projects than for short-term
projects. Although such procedures will not in general replicate the optimal rule, they do
represent an intuitive response to correctly perceived costs and benefits.
We stress that this result should not be interpreted as implying a blanket preference for
short-payback projects, regardless of NPV. In general, there is a trade-off between payback and
NPV; shorter payback encourages investment, but not if it comes at the expense of too much
NPV. The point of our analysis is not that shorter payback is always preferred, but rather that
it lowers the NPV necessary to justify investment.
An alternative way of expressing our result is that the required yield on any project is an
increasing function of payback period. This interpretation is helpful for comparing our story
with that of Cornell (1999). He considers a mean-variance world where all future expected
cashflows are discounted at a constant rate ρ which contains a premium for systematic risk.
Cornell’s argument is that (i) most systematic variation in asset returns is due to time-varying
expected returns and (ii) expected return fluctuations have a greater effect on the returns to
long-term assets because of the compounding effect. Consequently, long-term investments have
greater systematic risk and thus their cashflows should rationally be discounted at a higher rate.
That is
ρ = r + g(Payback), g′ > 0,
where g(·) is the risk premium. In our story, the analogous equation is
ρ = r + h(Payback), h′ > 0,
where h(·) is the “delay” premium. The difference between these two equations is straightfor-
ward. In both models, the discount rate ρ is the opportunity cost of the capital used to finance
investment. In Cornell’s model, the opportunity cost of investment today is the expected return
on another investment of equivalent systematic risk. The shorter a project’s payback period,
the lower its systematic risk and hence, given risk-averse investors, the lower the cost of capital.
In our model, systematic risk is zero, but investment today means forgoing the opportunity to
make the same investment at a future date, so the cost of capital must reflect this sacrifice. The
shorter a project’s payback period, the smaller the sacrifice and hence the lower the opportunity
cost of capital. In contrast to Cornell, our story applies even when interest rate shocks are
unsystematic.
The primary objective of our analysis is prescriptive, insofar as it provides a justification
for why firms should use payback. However, it also has some descriptive implications that can
be compared with actual capital budgeting practice. In particular, our model predicts that
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payback should be used in conjunction with NPV or some other discounted cashflow method
rather than in isolation, and that its use should be observed primarily in firms with investments
that have significant waiting value. As it turns out, both of these phenomena are empirically
observable. Survey research indicates that firms that use the payback calculation primarily do
so in conjunction with discounted cashflow methods. For example, Stanley and Block (1984)
find that 5% of respondents use payback as their primary evaluation method, but 38% use it as
an ancillary technique. Oblak and Helms (1980) find the corresponding percentages to be 10%
and 62% respectively. Other more recent studies report similar findings.9 Moreover, payback
seem to be more extensively used in firms with significant business or financial risk, i.e., those
with projects that are likely to have high values of waiting. For example, Binder and Chaput
(1996) and Schall and Sundem (1980) find that the use of payback is positively associated with
the level of economic uncertainty. Similarly, Poterba and Summers (1995) report that U.S.
CEOs cite a credible government commitment to long-term tax stability as a significant factor
in discouraging myopic investment decisions.
One feature of our model that may seem somewhat restrictive is the assumption that firms
can delay investment only once and only until a fixed future date s. However, this seems unlikely
to alter the role we have proposed for payback. To see this, suppose that firms have the choice
of investing or delaying at every date, so today’s invest-delay decision is made in the knowledge
that the same decision will be available (assuming delay is chosen today) at the next date.
Consequently, investment today incurs the costs of (i) forgoing the opportunity to make the
same investment again at the next date if economic conditions turn out to be better at that
date and (ii) forgoing the opportunity to delay investment again at the next date if economic
conditions turn out to be worse. In our model, by contrast, only cost (i) exists because there is
no option to delay again at time s. Our payback principle therefore reflects the greater upside
potential of long-payback projects. But such projects also have greater downside potential and
so have a higher cost (ii) as well. Thus, inclusion of multiple delay dates in our model would, if
anything, accentuate the link between payback and the value of waiting.
Finally, we emphasize the obvious point that payback is useful (at least in the way we
envisage) only to the extent that the value of waiting is significant. As some authors (see, for
example, Pindyck, 1993; Milne and Whalley, 2000; and Boyle and Guthrie, 2003b) have pointed
out, various outside factors can substantially reduce this value. If these factors turn out to have
practical relevance, then our case for payback is weakened.
4 Concluding Remarks
One of the first things students are taught about capital budgeting is that project value depends
only on the total discounted value of expected cashflows. The timing of cashflows matters to the
extent that it affects this total discounted value, but not otherwise. Thus, project evaluation
9See Jog and Srivastava (1995) for Canadian evidence.
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methods that hold long-term projects to a higher standard than short-term projects are deficient
mechanisms for maximizing firm value. Their only redeeming feature, it is said, is that they may
provide some crude adjustment for liquidity and/or risk differences and thus yield some indirect
information about firm value (see, for example, Brigham et al. 1999, pp. 426–29; and Ross et al.
1991, pp. 199–203). Nevertheless, surveys of capital budgeting practice indicate a bias against
long-term projects, perhaps reflecting the often-expressed practitioner belief that “short-term”
is strongly correlated with “low risk”.
In this paper, we have shown that there may be some justification for firms to favour short-
term investments, and that this justification is not too far removed from the traditional view that
long-term investments are riskier. Such projects are more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations
and hence have more to gain from waiting to acquire more information about their true value.
Thus, the dynamic opportunity cost of investment is greater for projects with long payback,
so value-maximisation requires that the investment payoff needed to justify investment be an
increasing function of payback.
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